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Snyder: Special Assessments--Necessity of Notice to Mortgages

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
the loan. By giving effect to the parol evidence the court could
declare the deed a mortgage and thus leave it open to the state
to assert its claim to unpaid taxes. In a word, it would have been
a decision which effectuated justice both to the state and the one
to whom the money, if the truth of the thing is allowed to be
shown, rightfully belongs.
-JAM.S

A. M WHORTER.

SPECIAL AsSESSMENTS-NECESSITY OF NOTICE TO MORTGGEES.-

A mortgage company, holding deeds of trust to real estate in the
municipality of Dunbar, sought to enforce the priority of their
lien against a subsequent paving assessment levied on the same
property by the city. In affirming the superiority of the assessment lien, the Supreme Court of Appeals decided that no notice
to the mortgagee was necessary. Mortgage Company of Maryland
v. Lory.'
As a general rule notice is necessary to bind the property owner
by special assessments,' However, cases have sustained the validity
of special assessments wherein no notice has been given.' In Davis
v. Lynchburg,"the Virginia court bound the property owner without notice of assessment, reasoning that proceedings of the work
itself was sufficient notice to the owner. In the absence of statute
requiring the same, other cases have held no notice of special
assessment is necessary.' A mortgagee, who has a contingent interest, at the most a defeasible security interest, would seem to present a weaker case for notice.
The rule seems to be well settled that notice by publication is
sufficient, if properly and reasonably given for the benefit of
property owners.
Also, if the property owner can contest the
'154 S. E. 136 (W. Va. 1930).
Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 53 S. E. 401 (1906); 4 DILLON, MuN.
CORP. (5th ed. 1911) § 1365; 5 McQUILLIN, MUN. CORP. (2nd ed. 1928) §
2226.
'Stevenson v. N. Y., 1 Hun 51 (N. Y. 1874).
'84 Va. 861, 6 S. E. 230 (1888).
5Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 29, 15 N. E. 908 (1888); Paulson v. Portland, 16 Ore. 450, 19 Pac. 450 (1888).
'Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 11 Sup. Ct. 825 (1890) ; Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255, 23 Sup. Ct. 574 (1902) ; Citizens' Savings Bank v. Greenbaugh, 173 N. Y. 215, 65 N. E. 978 (1903).
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assessment by lawsuit, it is not a deprivation of "due process"
that no notice was given him.7
The West Virginia Code, 1923 c. 29, § 54, states clearly that
for purposes of taxation, the mortgagor is deemed the owner of
the property taxed, unless the mortgagee be in actual possession.
An Indiana court,8 bound by an identical statute,9 decided that
only such property owner as was specified by the statute was
entitled to notice of special assessments and denied a mortgagee
this right.
The Code, 1923 c. 47, § 49 pars. 4 & 5, provides for notice of
assessment proceedings to actual property owners: first by publication of a resolution for paving, second by notice of the passage
of the said resolution, served pursuant to the Code procedure,
1923 c. 121 § 1. However, if the property owner is a non-resident,
or unascertainable for some reason, service may be had on him by
publication." This statute would seem to place the ability of the
mortgagee to ascertain the fact of assessment proceedings on about
the same scale with that of the non-resident or absentee property
owner.
The West Virginia court decided that no notice
of paving
The point
assessment was necessary, unless required by statute.'
of Mortgage Company of Maryland v. Lory has never before been
adjudicated in this state. Actual decisions elsewhere are few.
However, these decisions are uniform in refusing the mortgagee
One states
a right of notice.'
Various reasons are advanced.
that a mortgagee takes his lien subject to the right of the state,
Conor its delegated authority, to impose special assessments.
sequently the possible impairment of his lien does not amount to a
A second reason advanced is that
violation of "due process"."
Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300, 22 Sup. Ct. 122 (1901) ; Reclamation District v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635, 4 Pac. 676 (1884); Kinston v. Loftin, 149
N. C. 255, 62 S. E. 1069 (1908).
0Baldwin v. Moroney, 173 Ind. 574, 91 N. E. 3 (1909).
9IIND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1908), par. 10279.
49,
'0 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 47,

§
par. 5.
n Heavener v. City of Elkins, 69 W. Va. 255, 71 S. E. 184 (1911).
" Fitchpatrick v. Botheras, 150 Iowa 376, 130 N. W. 163 (1911); Norwich
v. Hubbard, 22 Conn. 587 (1853); Leitch v. City of Dublin, 160 Ga. 752,
128 S. E. 889 (1925); Drainage Commissioners v. East Carolina Association,
165 N. C. 697, 81 S. E. 947 (1914); Richmond v. Williams, 102 Va. 733,
47 S. E. 844 (1904); cf. Providence Institution for Savings v. Jersey City,
113 U. S. 506, 5 Sup. Ct. 612 (1885); Baldwin v. Moroney, suprra n. 8.
' Fitchpatrick v. Botheras, supra n. 12; Providence Inst. for Savings v.
Jersey City, supra n. 12. Would not this rather appear to be a legal conclusion, assuming the point rather .than answering it?
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the right of the public to assess against land for public use is paramount to any vested right of ownership."
A third case decides
that as no notice is required to anyone for general taxes," the
reason for which is mere maintainence of government, no notice
should be required in special assessments to an interested party,
such as a mortgagee, because he is theoretically receiving an enhancement to the -value of the property held under lien."
However, there must be some other reason back of this nominal
rationale.
Courts have sympathized with the position of the
mortgagee, but regret their inability to assist him."
Do not the
courts seem to balance the purely contingent and defeasible right
of the mortgagee against the administrative inconvenience to be
caused by the requirement of notice to the lienholder?
Couple
also the fact that it would by analogy lead to the same requirement for all other lienholders and it seems fit to require that the
mortgagee to on the'"qui vive" rather than to adopt another
prerequisite to the validity of an essentially difficult administrative function. In any event it would appear that the rule of
Mortgage Company of Maryland v. Lory will remain settled law
for West Virginia.
-HENRY

P. SNYDER.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-APPLICABILITY OF WORKMEN'S CozaPENSATION ACT TO INTERSTATE EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN INTRASTATE

WORK AT TrIE OF INJURY.-In Towns v. Monongahela Railway
Company1 an employee, who was engaged at time in both interstate and intrastate work, sued his interstate employer.
A hand car, which he and others were busily pumping
along the main line towards an unfinished sidetrack,' was
"Murphy v. Beard, 138 Ind. 560, 38 N. E. 33 (1894); Wilson v. Cal.
Bank, 121 Cal. 630, 54 Pac. 119 (1898); Norwich v. Hubbard, supra n. 12;
People v. Weber, 164 Ill. 412, 45 N. E. 723 (1897); Dressman v. Simonin,
104 Ky. 693, 47 S. W. 767 (1898).
Does this consist with the idea that
notice should be prerequisite to the exercise of this public right?
"DiLLonT, op. cit. supra n. 2; McQUiLLIN, op. ct. supra n. 2.
20Supra n. 8.
17Norwich v. Hubbard, supra n. 12.
1153 S. E. 919 (W. Va. 1930).
'The siding, in process of original construction for a
products in both interstate and intrastate commerce, was
to the main line. It was not, therefore, an instrumentality
merce. McKee v. Elec. Ry. Co., 78 W. Va. 131, 88 S.
ROBERTS, FEDERAL LIBImLy O' CARRIERS (2nd ed. 1929)
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